Research.
What we've broken, and how.
Notes from the lab
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Jul 22, 2026Does It Discover, or Does It Recall?
The question that separates a real automated bug-finder from a demo. We ran the airtight version, bugs fixed after the model's training cutoff, stripped, no hints, and the honest 0/4 result maps the actual frontier of automated discovery better than any win would have.
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Jul 21, 2026Finding the Bug Is the Easy Part. Knowing It's New Is the Hard Part.
Our engine confirmed a real kernel-privilege primitive in a stripped, closed-source Windows driver. Machine-verified, no symbols. It called the bug novel. It was a CVE from 2024. Here is the failure mode that hides in every automated bug-finder, and the gate we built so it can't happen again.
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Jul 20, 2026The Drivers Nobody Fuzzed
The signed Windows drivers that hand attackers kernel access are closed-source: no symbols, no source, invisible to every source-based fuzzer. We built a machine that locates the dangerous IOCTL in a stripped .sys and confirms the primitive on a live kernel, no human in the loop. Here is how, and the discipline that keeps it honest.
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Jul 19, 2026The Bug With No Source, No Symbols, No Debug Info
Strip a binary of source, symbols, and DWARF and it is supposed to be opaque to automated analysis. We stripped an OSS-Fuzz target of all three and our engine still found the bug. A stripped binary is an information problem, not an impossibility.
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Jul 17, 2026When the Sanitizer Is the Wrong Oracle
Two recently-patched Linux kernel use-after-frees. Trivially reachable from an unprivileged process, they fire on demand and produce zero KASAN reports by construction. A study in the two most misread words in exploitation: 'reachable' and 'confirmed'.
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Jul 16, 2026AI Agents Are Entering the Kernel
The real benchmark for AI security research is whether a finding survives maintainer review, lands upstream, and gets carried into the software people actually run. The public record is starting to show ours does.
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Jul 14, 2026Your validator checked one value. Your app used another.
A validation soundness bug class in JavaScript. Some widely-used validators inspect the caller's live object and hand it back unchanged, so a getter or Proxy can slip a value past the schema that the app then uses. We confirmed it in class-validator and superstruct. joi and zod are safe, and the reason they are safe is the fix. Reported upstream.
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Jul 11, 2026One Research Loop, Evidence Matched to the Target
Why vulnerability research needs target-specific harnesses and oracles, but one shared discipline for evidence, novelty, and impact.
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Jul 9, 2026A 15-Year-Old Out-of-Bounds Read in the Linux Kernel's NFC Stack
An unauthenticated NFC peer could crash the kernel with one malformed frame. The bug shipped in 2011 and sat in every kernel since. Automated source analysis surfaced it. The fix is accepted upstream in the NFC maintainer tree and heading to mainline (ed85d4cbbfaa).
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Jul 5, 2026The Bugs Fuzzers Can't See
Automated kernel bug-finding has converged on one technique: fuzzing. It has a ceiling built in. We do it differently. We read the source and reason about it, to find the bug classes a fuzzer is structurally blind to.
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Jun 3, 2026Switzerland Has No Doorbell
Nine in ten Swiss websites publish no security.txt, so a researcher has no way to report a vulnerability. We checked every .ch domain in two public lists. Here is the data, and the ten-minute fix.
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May 20, 2026The Triage Moat and Multi-Benchmark Validation
Ablation testing as scientific method: an 11-layer false-positive triage stack, the one broken layer that almost masked the rest, and the multi-benchmark portfolio that surfaces what a single suite would miss.
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May 17, 2026Web Vulnerability Benchmarks: Methodology and Environment Verification
Over 37% of standard web vulnerability challenges fail to build on clean systems because Docker images and package repos rot. Read the benchmark score without knowing the substrate and you cannot compare it to anything.
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May 14, 2026Agentic Pentesting: The Shell-First Architecture
Shell-first design as a discovered architecture for autonomous pentesting agents. One bash tool outperforms a structured toolkit across public benchmarks, the AI/LLM security suite, and adjacent domains.
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May 7, 2026Orchestration, Not Frontier: What the IronCurtain Post Means for 0sec
Niels Provos shipped a vulnerability-discovery framework that replicates Mythos-class findings on commercial models, plus one autonomous CVE on an open-weight model. It is the same bet 0sec is built on. Here is what we already do, what we need to borrow, and the four gaps we are closing.
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Apr 8, 2026Deleting better-sqlite3, and What It Cost
An engineering note from building 0sec's engine. We migrated the persistence layer from better-sqlite3 to a pure-WASM SQLite build. What broke, what we kept, and why dropping the native module made the engine run identically on every Node.js version.
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Apr 6, 2026Introducing 0cloud
An autonomous AI attacker on contract, pointed at your product. Closed beta, by application only. Founder-led from Zürich.
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Apr 4, 2026The Attack Surface Traditional Benchmarks Don't Test
Traditional web vulnerability benchmarks miss the entire AI/LLM security attack surface. Prompt injection, jailbreaks, MCP tool abuse: none of it appears in standard 104-challenge web security suites.
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Mar 30, 2026Blind Verification: How False Positives Get Killed
Every security scanner drowns its users in false positives. Closing that gap took three architectural attempts before one of them worked.
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Mar 27, 2026How AI Agents Found Vulnerabilities in Popular npm Packages
A three-week methodology validation. Claude Opus, applied systematically to popular npm packages, surfaced 73 findings and disclosed vulnerabilities across packages with 55M+ weekly downloads. Here is how the workflow operates.
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Mar 24, 2026The Age of Agentic Security
If AI agents can write 1,000 pull requests a week, AI agents should be testing 1,000 pull requests a week. The asymmetry is about to collapse.
The public track record.
Every vulnerability we've disclosed. Each one links to its public record.
Reviewed by engineers at
GHSA-8gq3-vp5j-2grp CVE-2026-63801 CVE-2026-63831 Merged upstream Queued upstream CVE-2026-52746 CVE-2026-63944 Merged upstream, stable-backported Merged upstream Queued upstream In review In review In review In review Merged upstream, stable-backported Merged upstream, stable-backported In review Merged upstream Queued upstream Merged upstream Queued upstream In review In review Queued upstream In review In review In review In review In review In review In review In review In review Queued upstream Updated continuously. Embargoed findings appear once they're fixed.
Work with the lab.
You build critical software, or you break it for a living. Let's talk.